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This article asks whether Central and Eastern European societies should be seen as fully 
consolidated democracies or whether they should still be considered as democracies at risk. 
Using the concept of embedded democracy developed by Wolfgang Merkel and the 
members of the project on “Defective Democracies”, this paper argues that Central and 
Eastern European societies should be defined as semi-consolidated democracies, since one 
of the three rings of external embeddedness (the ring concerning the social and economic 
requisites of democracy) still shows significant deficiencies. The main argument is that due to 
the presence of shortcomings in the socio-economic environment, the process of democratic 
stabilization in the region is still far from finished. This is primarily reflected in the attitudes of 
Eastern European citizens towards non-democratic forms of government. Due to the 
important democratizing role of welfare institutions, this paper also proposes the inclusion of 
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Introduction 
The last wave of EU Enlargement on 1
st May 2004 seems to have unreservedly implied the 
ultimate transition of Central and Eastern European societies to the circle of fully 
consolidated democracies. Are really things going in this way? Is EU accession alone able to 
stabilize the post-communist transition toward democracy? The aim of this article is to 
challenge this issue by asking whether Central and Eastern European societies should be 
described as fully consolidated democracies or rather as democracies at risk. Due to the 
presence of shortcomings in the socio-economic environment, the process of democratic 
stabilization in the region seems, in fact, still far from being finished. How can a democracy 
be addressed as stabilized if an always larger part of its population is systematically 
excluded from the economic improvements of the country?  
 
In order to substantiate this argument, firstly, a brief overview of the economic performance 
of East European countries in transition is provided. A special focus is given not only to their 
economic achievements, but also and, more importantly, to the repercussions of economic 
crisis on the population. Subsequently, an analysis will be conducted on the Consolidation of 
Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 1990-2001 database (2005)  (from here onwards 
CDCEE database) provided by the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) of the 
University of Cologne. Here, the aim is to explore the relationships between social structure 
and orientation towards democracy. Finally, the role of welfare institutions as important 
democratizing forces will be discussed in context with the above research. The main 
argument here is that welfare state efficiency, on grounds of its democratizing function, 
should be included as a key element in the measurement of democratic consolidation of a 
country. 
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The Concepts of Embedded and Defective Democracies 
Assessing the quality, and the problems, of democracy has been the object of numerous 
studies
1. Despite the existing extensive literature, the multi-dimensional character of 
democracy makes this research extremely difficult and only partially successful. The problem 
lies in determining which factors should be included and/ or excluded from any analysis of a 
democratic system. In the press, democracy often becomes synonym of electoral 
democracy, a term correctly accused of being extremely misleading for scholars and 
researchers willing to identify the main attributes of a democratic system
2. It is, in fact, not 
sufficient for a democracy to be defined as such only on the basis of the existence of 
relatively free elections. Rather, the interconnections of several dimensions should be 
accurately taken into account. It also seems that the indexes of democratic stability 
developed by Freedom House or by the Bertelsmann Foundation are also insufficient in 
identifying the character of democracy. Their primary analytical focus remains on electoral 
representation in the case of Freedom House
3 or, for the most part, in the attachment to a 
market economy in the case of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index
4.  
 
A substantially more systematic and less arbitrary approach to the study of democracy is the 
one proposed by Wolfgang Merkel with the concept of embedded democracy (Merkel et al. 
                                                 
1 Among the most often cited books see, for instance, Lipset (1959), Dahl (1971), O’Donnel and 
Schmitter (1986), Sartori (1987), Diamond and Lipset (1989), Di Palma 1990), Huntington (1991), 
Przeworski (1991), Putnam (1993), O’Donnel (1994), Linz and Stepan (1996), Dahl (1989),   
Lijphart (1999). For the most recent contributions, see special issue of Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics, 'The Quality of Democracy in Post-Communist Europe' (vol. 20, no 
1, March 2004) or Diamond and Morlino (2005). 
2 In the case of “electoral democracy”, only the electoral side of a democracy is highlighted, while 
other important aspects, such as the absence of inequality, tend to be systematically neglected. 
For a detailed discussion on the inadequacy of the concept of “electoral democracy” as well as 
various indexes of democratization, see Merkel et al. (2003), Berg-Schlosser (2004), Merkel 
(2004), Puhle (2005). 
3 Freedom House classifies countries as liberal, semi-liberal and illiberal according to a seven-point 
scale, which, for the most part, pays attention to the functioning of formal institutions, such as a 
fair electoral process, and the existence of a well developed civil society. Freedom House 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/). 
4 The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) has its major focus on democratization and market 
liberalization operationalized by two parallel indexes: the Status Index and the Management Index. 
The Status Index shows “the development achieved by the states on their way toward democracy 
and a market economy”, while the Management Index “reveals the extent to which governments 
and political actors have been consistent and determined in their pursuit of a market-based 
democracy”. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) (http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/) Alfio Cerami – Why Should Central and Eastern European Societies still be considered as Democracies at Risk? 
2003; Merkel 2004). For Wolfgang Merkel, and for the members of the project on “Defective 
Democracies”, an analytical concept of democracy should be concerned with defining the 
elements and conditions (of embeddedness) integrate to democracy, as well as the common 
defects and their causes that hinder democracies. 
 
Put it very briefly, democracy is understood as internally and externally embedded in a wider 
socio-political environment. Internally, five different partial regimes secure the normative and 
functional existence of democracy. These correspond to: (a) the electoral regime; (b) political 
liberties; (c) civil rights; (d) horizontal accountability; and (e) effective power to govern. 
Externally, these partial regimes (or sub-regimes of democracy) are embedded in “spheres of 
enabling conditions for democracy that protect it from the outer as well as inner shocks and 
destabilizing tendencies” (Merkel et al. 2003; Merkel 2004, p.34). These correspond to: (i) 
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Figure 1. The Concept of Embedded Democracy 
 
            (Source: Merkel 2004, Fig. 1, p.37) 
 
The  electoral regime (a) involves the institutional structures that allow open and free 
elections and that, as a consequence, corresponds to the citizens’ minimal rights of fair 
electoral representation. Political liberties (b), by contrast, refers to the possibility of access 
to political communication and organization through, for instance, the formation of interest 
groups free and independent from the state authority. Another important element is given by 
civil rights (c), which concern the possibility of being preserved from the “tyranny of 
majority
5”. This involves, for example, the protection of life, of freedom, of property, but also 
the equal access to law and equal treatment. With horizontal accountability (d), it is intended 
that the surveillance of elected authorities by a network of independent and autonomous 
institutions be clearly defined by the constitution. Here, the core issue is the so-often quoted 
“check and balance” of powers. Finally, the fifth partial regime is given by the effective power 
to govern (e), that is to say, by the effective possibility that who has been elected is also the 
                                                 




















Social and economic requisites Alfio Cerami – Why Should Central and Eastern European Societies still be considered as Democracies at Risk? 
one who governs and that, for example, no other forces, such as the military, come to 
change the rules of the game.  
 
According to Merkel (Merkel 2004, p.43), these five “partial regimes can only function 
effectively in a democracy if they are mutually embedded” or, in other words, if they are 
mutually connected influencing and supporting each other. Internal embeddedness, however, 
is not sufficient to ensure democracy. External factors also play a crucial rule in fostering the 
democratic stability of a country. These factors  also represent, more importantly, a threat to 
the democratic institutions already established. As illustrated in Figure 1, three main external 
factors are identified. Stateness, which refers to the existence of a state able to ensure that 
the rules of the game are put into practice (the opposite would be anarchy) (Puhle 2005, p. 
10).  Civil society, the second most important external factor, has several times been 
addressed as crucial for the democratic stability of a country. In particular, Merkel 
remembers that civil society provides: (a) protection from the arbitrary state rule (the Lockean 
function); (b) helps the separation of powers through a “corps intermédiaire” (the 
Montesquieuian function); (c) is the “school of democracy” where citizens can develop a 
more democratic thinking (the Tocquevillean function); and (d) represents a form of pre-
institutional public sphere of critical public discourse (the Habermasian function (Merkel 
2004, p.46). It has also been constantly demonstrated, that civil society fosters the 
development of social capital helping the consolidation of democratic institutions (Gabriel and 
Verba 1963, 1980; Merkel 1996; Rüb 1996; Merkel and Lauth  1998; Putnam 1993, 2000). 
Finally, the socio-economic context in which the different sub-regimes are embedded is a 
crucial factor in predicting the democratic stability of a country. This argument, introduced by 
the seminal work of Lipset (Lipset 1959, 1960; Lipset et al. 1993), emphasizes the 
importance (although not the exclusiveness, as often affirmed) of the economic performance 
of a country in the process of democratic stabilization. In addition, the interregional and 
regional integration may also help the stabilization of democracy. There is also a special 
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emphasis given to the role that international institutions (such as the European Union) can 
play in fostering the introduction and reinforcement of democratic values.  
 
On the basis of the abovementioned model of embedded democracy, Merkel and his 
collaborators (Merkel et al. 2003) test for the presence of defects that might damage the 
democratic institutions recently implemented. Between the two opposites (authoritarian and 
liberal democracies), Merkel identifies four types of defective democracies: (1) exclusive 
democracy; (2) domain democracy; (3) illiberal democracy; and (4) delegative democracy.  
 
Merkel’s results, at the beginning of 2002, show that the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia were already addressed as liberal 
democracies (in that transition towards democracy has been faster and also its long-term 
sustainability seems ensured by the presence of effective, relatively stable and mutually 
embedded partial regimes), while defective democracies included Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine (illiberal democracies in that the “constitutional state is 
incomplete and damaged, and constitutional norms have little impact on government actions. 
Civil rights are also limited or partially suspended”) (Merkel 2004, pp. 49-50) and Latvia (an 
exclusive democracy in that “one or more segments of all adult citizens are excluded from 
the civil right of universal coverage”) owing to the presence of not yet consolidated 
democratic institutions (primarily involving the internal dimension of embeddedness). This 
kind of categorization is certainly more systematic and more adequate than the one provided 
by Freedom House or by the Bertelsmann Foundation. It still raises, however, a couple of 
important questions, particularly with regard to the external dimensions of embeddedness in 
that whether countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia, that are characterized by the presence of a still “defective” 
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The Socio-Economic Context 
The collapse of the Iron Curtain opened the door to a new wave of democratization in 
Europe, but it also coincided with a severe economic and human crisis, which is still affecting 
the people of Central and Eastern Europe. After the euphoria of the first months of transition, 
citizens and politicians of Eastern Europe were soon confronted with a bitter reality: the 
transition towards democracy would have implied extremely high social costs and these 
costs would have influenced the lives of million citizens for many years to come. This bitter 
reality materialized principally in a stagnant economy, raising unemployment, and a drastic 
increase in poverty and income inequality (with its associated disadvantages). In order to 
provide a first response to the increasing pressures coming from the restructuring of the 
political and economic system, national governments introduced drastic macro-economic 
stabilization measures, as suggested by the most influential international financial institutions 
(notably the IMF and the World Bank). If, on the macro economic side, these actions partially 
succeeded to avoid a further deterioration of national budgets, on the social side, these 
measures were highly risky and catapulted many millions of  Eastern European citizens in an 
unexpected reality of inexorable poverty. 
 
As Figure 2 and Figure 3 show, although real GDP growth has now reached, in almost all 
countries, the level it had in the beginning of the transformation, this has not coincided with 
sufficient job creation. The trend in employment growth shows, in fact, more dramatic results 
with almost all countries finding themselves below the level they had in 1990. Numerous 
explanations for such negative trend have been given, but, perhaps, the most convincing one 
is provided by Nesporova (1999, 2002a, 2002b), who identifies as the main reason the 
                                                 
6 Please note that due to the last wave of EU Enlargement in May 2004 and the future one 
expected in 2007, all new and future EU Member States  now tend to be considered as liberal 
democracies.  Alfio Cerami – Why Should Central and Eastern European Societies still be considered as Democracies at Risk? 
necessity of enterprises to be competitive, by reducing labour costs and redundant labour, 
while simultaneously increasing production. This obviously involved a decrease in real wages 
and consequently poverty for workers. 
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The negative economic performance of transition countries coupled with mistakes in 
sequencing the orders of reforms (Stiglitz 2002) resulted in a drastic raise in income equality 
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(see Figure 4), with an increasing section of the population now formally excluded from a 
normal and socially desirable life. Here, it is important to point out that the most vulnerable 
groups of transition are also those most vulnerable in the labour market (such as women, 
semi-skilled or low-skilled workers, employees of ex state-owned enterprises, people 
belonging to ethnic minorities, or citizens with handicap)
7. A recent report on social inclusion 
in Europe sponsored by the European Commission sadly recognized that “in the majority of 
the new Member States many of the expected improvements from recent changes [those 
following the transformation towards a market economy] have yet to fully materialize” 
(European Commission 2004, p. 11). 
 




















































































Preferences for One-Party System  
Before going into an in-depth explanation of the calculations made, a brief description of the 
database used in this study is necessary. The CDCEE database is the result of a cross-
country survey which has included several experts and interviewers in numerous Central and 
Eastern European countries (Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and 
Krasnoyarsk). Personal interviews with a standardized questionnaire have involved a 
                                                 
7 For more information on the changes occurring in Central and Eastern European social policy, see 
Cerami (2006a).  Alfio Cerami – Why Should Central and Eastern European Societies still be considered as Democracies at Risk? 




8 of individuals aged 18 and older living in permanent residence. 
Interviews have been carried out in two waves. The first wave was conducted between 1990 
and 1992, while the second wave took place between 1998 and 2001. The main goal of this 
comparative research project was to analyze the current state of consolidation of democratic 
institutions in the region, primarily focusing on the changes in political culture.    
 
Calculations involve the following question “Which do you think would be better for our 
country: one party or multi-party system?” and are made according to the position of 
individuals in the social and labour structure
9. This very simple question leaves no doubt for 
possible misunderstandings of what the respondent really wishes for his or her country and is 
also expressed in a way that does not suppose that one item is implicitly better than the 
other. 
 
Table 1 provides information on the relationships between labour structure and preferences 
for one-party system among the different transition countries in the years immediately after 
the collapse of communism (round of interviews 1990-1992). As it can be seen, in all 
employment sectors, workers showed clear preferences for multi-party systems. At the 
beginning of transition, only 11% of employees of the state or of state-owned enterprises
10, 
as well as independently employed, still demonstrated preferences for one-party system, 
followed by the members of a cooperative or a collective farm, with a modest, if compared to 
more recent results, 17%. Here, it is interesting to note how only in Poland, Romania and 
Slovak Republic the members of a cooperative or a collective farm were close to the 
                                                 
8 The sample includes 28 926 cases. Belarus: 1000 (2. wave: 1998); Bulgaria: 1074 (1. wave: 
1990), 1021 (2. wave: 1999); Czech Republic: 1003 (1. wave: 1990), 1004 (2. wave: 2001); 
Estonia: 943 (1. wave: 1991), 1000 (2. wave: 2001); East Germany: 1087 (1. wave: 1992), 1013 
(2. wave: 2000); West Germany: 1022 (2. wave: 2000); Hungary: 1277 (1. wave: 1990), 1086 
(2. wave: 1999); Latvia: 1099 (2. wave: 1998); Lithuania: 918 (1. wave: 1991), 1005 (2. wave: 
2001); Poland: 919 (1. wave: 1991), 1369 (2. wave: 2000); Romania: 1234 (1. wave: 1990), 
1208 (2. wave: 1998); Krasnojarsk: 1485 (1. wave); Russia: 1500 (2. wave: 1998); Slovakia: 
1033 (2. wave: 2001); Slovenia: 686 (1. wave: 1991), 1001 (2. wave: 1999); Ukraine: 1079 (1. 
wave: 1991), 1200 (2. wave: 1998). To adjust the Bulgarian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish 
and Russian sample, a weighting factor is provided by the institutions responsible.  
9 For the purpose of this study only the datasets of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are used.   
10 This group of people were, at the time, almost the majority of workers. Alfio Cerami – Why Should Central and Eastern European Societies still be considered as Democracies at Risk? 
threshold of one-fifth (24%) of preferences for one-party system. By contrast, with regard to 
the independently employed, distribution of responses were more equal and only Poland 
showed a high result of 33% of preferences for one-party system against an average of 11%. 
Finally, family members helping out the major income earners showed the lowest 
preferences for one-party system with an average of 5%, considerably overcome only in 
Hungary with a score of 16%.   
Table 1 Employment status: Preferences for one-party system Wave 1 (1990-1992) 
 
CEE  Bulgaria  Czech 
Rep. 







11  5  6 11  10 NA 16 15  13 9 NA 
Member of a 
coop./coll. 
farm 
17  13  18 11  19 NA  6 24  24 24 NA 
Independen- 






5  6  0 5  16 NA  6 NA  0 0 NA 
Source: Author's calculations using CDCEE database 
 
The second wave of interviews, which took place in all countries between 1998 and 2001 
provided more detailed information (of position of the individual in the labour market) for 
analysis. Table 2 shows not only that the preferences for one-party system increased during 
the decade, but it also shows that the lower the position of the individual in the labour 
structure, the higher are his or her preferences for one party-system. The distribution of 
preferences tends, however, not to be homogeneous. In countries, where the social 
consequences of economic transition have been more painful, individuals in the lower social 
classes also show greater preferences for one-party system (see, for example, the results of 
the Baltic States, Romania and Slovakia). Deeper analysis of occupations shows that 
employers are, as a norm, more determined in preferring a multi-party rather as one-party 
system and only in the Baltic States and Slovakia the percentages are close to, or overcome, 
20%. 
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Similar, considerations apply to highly educated specialists and non-manual office 
supervisors. With non-manual office non-supervisors and foreman supervisors, the 
percentages of respondents who prefer one-party systems tend to increase, to an average of 
15%. This situation worsens, however, among skilled workers and, more clearly, among 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. The percentages of those who prefer a one-party system 
tend not only to be well above the threshold of 20%, but they also reach, for unskilled 
workers, 42% in the case of Lithuania and even 50% in Romania. Clearer orientations for 
one-party systems are expressed by farmers and, especially, by agricultural workers. Here, 
the percentages of one-party preferences are 30% on average, such as in the cases of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania,  but rarely do they come close or 
overcoming the threshold of 40%. Interestingly, the members of armed or security forces do 
not show a drastic orientation for systems based on one party. Only in Estonia and Lithuania 
are these preferences close or overcome the threshold of 20%, while a worrying 40% exists 
only in Romania. 
Table 2 Occupation: Preference for one-party system (%) Wave 2 (1998-2001) 
 
CEE  Bulgaria  Czech 
Rep. 






11  0  7 21  0 23 14 0 0 31  11 
Employer:  
less than 10 
employees 












15  15  10 15  11 19  15 12  23 16 15 
Foreman/ 












31  24  25 11  35 28  42 28  50 38 33 
Farmer:  
own farm  16  0  0 0  22 20  43 27  49 0  0 
Agricultural 
worker  31  34  45 10  39 25  37 20  54 29 21 
Armed forces/ 
security  12  11  0 29  10 10  40 4  19 0  0 
Source: Author's calculations using CDCEE database 
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Employment sector preference, as shown by the precedent tables, also reveals that workers 
in agricultural sector are the group more likely to prefer one party-system, followed by 
employees of the state or of a state-owned enterprise (see CEE averages, Table 3). Intra-
country differences, however, exist. In Lithuania and Slovakia, respectively 27% and 22% of 
workers in governmental offices show preferences for one-party system, while this 
percentage in other countries tends to be substantially lower (with an average of 
approximately 14%). It is also interesting to note that employees of the state or of state-
owned enterprises in Romania and in Slovakia (the ratio is 36% and 26% respectively) show 
much higher preferences for one-party system than the Eastern European average of 19%. 
As far as private (non agricultural) self-employed and private (non agricultural) employed is 
concerned, these groups tend to show the lowest preferences for one-party system after 
workers in government. Only in Lithuania and Slovenia (23% and 29%) for private (non 
agricultural) self-employed and in Poland and Romania (23% and 27%) for private (non 
agricultural) employed do percentages tend to be substantially higher than in other countries. 
 
Table 3 Employment sector: Preference for one-party system (%) Wave 2 (1998-2001) 
Country 
CEE  Bulgaria  Czech 
Rep. 
Estonia Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Slovak 
Rep. 
Slovenia 
Government  14  7  7 10  13 14 27 10 15 22 15 








17  13  9 16  16 15 19 23 27 18 14 
Agriculture  27  36  25 15  16 22 37 26 47 31 21 
Other  22  30  25 12  14 46 15 3 23 27 NA 
Source: Author's calculations using CDCEE database   
 
Much easier and clearer is the preference for a one-party system by full-time and part-time 
workers, as well as for people not working at all. As it can be expected, full-time workers 
show the lowest preferences for one-party system (average 16%), followed by part-time 
workers (average 21%) and, finally, by the unemployed (average 25%). Even in this case, 
intra-region differences exist and show how the countries where the economic transition has 
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been more painful (particularly Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) also tend to show higher 
preferences for one-party system.    
 
Table 4 Work full-/part-time: Preference for one-party system (%) Wave 2 (1998-2001) 
 
CEE  Bulgaria  Czech 
Rep. 
Estonia Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Slovak 
Rep. 
Slovenia 
Full-time  16  17  8 14  13 12 20 14 27 19 12 
Part-time  21  10  24 17  21 20 35 15 32 23 11 
Not working  
at all  25  17  18 NA  22 25 30 19 44 26 18 
Source: Author's calculations using CDCEE database 
 
Similar patterns are present in the preferences according to the social class in which the 
respondents think to belong
11. Again, individuals who see themselves as belonging to the 
upper classes tend to have the lowest score (average 8%). Here, the only exceptions are 
Latvia with 40% of preferences for one-party system, followed by the Slovak Republic with 
22%. The second lowest preferences are expressed by people in the upper-middle classes, 
with an average of 12%. Averages of 14% in the case of lower middle-classes, of 24% for the 
working class and 27% for the peasant class are also clear to see. Important results to note 
here are the relatively high scores of Romania (39%) and Slovakia (33%) for the working 
class. Finally, particularly high scores are shown by citizens who refer themselves as 
belonging to the peasant class in Romania who express 50% of preferences for one-party 
systems against an already high average of 27%.    
  
Table 5 Social class of oneself: Preference for one-party system Wave 2 (1998-2001) 
 
CEE  Bulgaria  Czech 
Rep. 
Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Slovak 
Rep. 
Slovenia 
Upper class  8  0  0 NA  0 40 0 0 9 22 0 
Upper-middle 
class  12  16  9 18  6 10  20 8 13 12  6 
Lower-middle 
class  14  11  9 14  12 13 23 9 18 16 10 
Working class  24  17  14 16  24 26 27 22 39 33 22 
Peasant class  27  28  24 0  NA 19 32 26 50 32 28 
Source: Author's calculations using CDCEE database 
 
                                                 
11 This question refers to subjective class and not to the objective social position of the individual in 
the social structure. Alfio Cerami – Why Should Central and Eastern European Societies still be considered as Democracies at Risk? 
The Role of Welfare Institutions as Democratizing Forces  
New democracies cannot be consolidated overnight, but the democratic transition needs to 
be strengthened through long and ongoing processes of institutional innovation in which 
numerous elements can change or consolidate the rules of the game. According to Merkel 
(1996), for example, democratic consolidation necessarily involves the expansion of four 
main areas: 1) institutional consolidation; 2) representative consolidation; 3) behaviour 
consolidation; and 4) consolidation of the civic culture. Moreover, since regime change 
inevitably implies a significant degree of uncertainty (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986), in this 
unpredictable process of transformation, new political actors are called to reduce uncertainty 
by providing a new form of legitimacy. As Offe (1994) and Rüb (1996) have highlighted, new 
democratic rules must be institutionalized and shared by the community according to the 
principles agreed in advance with the citizens (the so-often quoted “social contract”). In this 
context, social security systems help to confer a moral legitimacy to the transformation 
towards a capitalist-based society, facilitating the creation of a new consensus around the 
new democratic rules (quoted in Cerami 2006a, p. 33). 
 
Here, the correct timing and sequencing of economic and social reforms becomes vital. In 
fact, not only economic growth per se is sufficient to understand the level of democratic 
consolidation of a nation, but rather a more exact indicator is given by the efficacy of 
redistributive policies. Contrary to common assumptions that see economic growth strictly 
linked to poverty reduction (Alam et al. 2005), a recent UN Economic Survey of Europe 
(UNECE 2004) has called attention to the fact that inequality has increased in the Baltic 
republics of Estonia and Lithuania where there has been rapid economic growth, as well as 
in Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania where growth has been less evident in recent 
years, but still present. It can thus be argued that in transition economies, not the market 
alone, but rather efficient welfare institutions can ensure a more equal redistribution of 
resources, especially for the less integrated groups of society.  
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For example, if no welfare state would exist, the percentages of people at risk of poverty
12 in 
the region would be substantially higher and, in particular, there would be more than 10% 
citizens at risk of poverty in Bulgaria, more than 20% in Estonia, Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia, between 30% and 40% in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, more than 40% in Poland 
and, finally, more than 60% in the Czech Republic. In plain numbers, this means 150 
thousand less people at risk of poverty in Bulgaria, 1.3 million in Czech Republic, 90 
thousand in Estonia, 500 thousand in Hungary, 180 thousand in Latvia, 270 thousand in 
Lithuania, 5.3 million in Poland, 1.1 million in Romania, 270 thousand in Slovakia and 120 
thousand in Slovenia (see Table 6).  
 
























Bulgaria  16 14  13  1 255 328  1 098 412  156 916  7 845 800 
Czech Rep.  21 8  62  2 142 693  816 264  1 326 429  10 203 300 
Estonia  25 18  28 339  000  244 080  94 920  1 356 000 
Hungary  17 12  29  1 724 208  1 217 088  507 120  10 142 400 
Latvia  24 16  33 559  560  373 040  186 520  2 331 500 
Lithuania  23 15  35 796  398  519 390  277 008  3 462 600 
Poland  31 17  45  11 847 735  6 497 145  5 350 590  38 218 500 
Romania  22 17  23  4 790 016  3 701 376  1 088 640  21 772 800 
Slovakia  28 21  25  1 506 176  1 129 632  376 544  5 379 200 
Slovenia  16 10  38 319  200  199 500  119 700  1 995 000 
Source: Eurostat 2005, Structural + Long-Term Indicators, Brussels, Eurostat. Author’s calculations. 
 
 
Nevertheless, despite the important role that Central and Eastern European welfare 
institutions have played in reducing poverty, especially during the first years of transition 
(Cerami 2006a, pp. 191-213), the balance sheet after more than a decade of transformation 
still remains extremely negative with approximately 16 million people living at risk of poverty 
in 2003
13. It is not by chance that recent studies on the perceptions of Eastern citizens on the 
social consequences of transition show an increasing feeling of insecurity and injustice that 
                                                 
12 Risk-of-poverty rate is defined as “the share of persons with an equivalised disposable income 
below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised 
disposable income (after social transfers). This share is calculated before social transfers (original 
income including pensions but excluding all other social transfers) and after social transfers (total 
income)”. Source:  Eurostat (2005). 
13 This is the sum of the total number of people at risk of poverty after transfers as shown in Table 
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may result in nostalgia for the system in force antecedently (Delhey and Tobsch 2000, 2003). 
Here, it is perhaps important to remember the main paradox that existed during communism, 
where market mechanisms and not welfare institutions played the main function of 
redistribution (Konrád and Szelényi 1978; King and Szelényi 2004). It is in fact no secret that 
the communist nomenklatura had succeeded to ensure for itself special privileges (such as 
better houses, longer holidays or better education), while the rest of the communist citizens 
could only rely on the redistributive effects of the central planned economy: a redistributive 
economic mechanism, which also ensured the legitimacy and stability of the system. With the 
collapse of central planned economy, this ambiguous redistributive equilibrium was suddenly 
interrupted, leaving the great majority of citizens fully unprotected.  
 
Welfare State Responses to New Risks 
What did go wrong in the reform process? Why has an inefficient social security system been 
replaced by a more non egalitarian one? Right timing and sequencing of reforms, for 
example, did not go hand in hand (Stiglitz 2002), but a brief overview of the social security 
reform process in the region also shows that monetarization and individualization of social 
risks (Cerami 2006b) have been the main characteristics of welfare state change, which have 
implied a rapid shift from public to private responsibility before a functioning economic 
system was put in place. This new welfare logic, very distant from the old state-paternalistic 
communist one, was not only limited to the most lucrative sectors of social protection, such 
as pensions, but it also involved other sensitive areas, such as health care, protection 
against unemployment, and social assistance. 
 
The three-pillar scheme of pension, sponsored by the leading international financial 
institutions (notably the World Bank) as the best way to tackle the problem of population 
ageing, has now been introduced in almost all Central and Eastern European new EU 
member states, with the sole exclusion of Czech Republic and Slovenia, where discussions 
about its full implementation, however, are not absent. Without going into a detailed analysis 
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of the risks linked to the establishment of private pension funds in times of market 
instability
14, the introduction of such schemes, due to the associated problem of “double-
payment
15”, has aggravated the budget of many social insurance funds
16, reducing the 
maneuvre of governments to invest in other sectors of social security.  
 
The reforms of the health care sector have primarily involved the introduction of health 
insurance. Financing a new health care model, distant from the Semashko system
17 in place 
during communism, with the money of workers instead of with the money of the state was 
seen as the fastest and easiest way to increase the level of health care expenditures (in all 
countries well below the OECD average) with a minimum effort of the state
18. Unfortunately, 
this policy option demonstrated several weaknesses in times of raising unemployment, 
aggravating instead of improving the status of the state budget. Central budgets in the region 
are now called to cover the solvency of numerous health insurance funds, but also to ensure 
several unprotected citizens, who otherwise would remain uninsured.  
 
As far as the sector of protection against unemployment is concerned, after a first period of 
generosity, when CEE governments introduced extensive early-retirement policies and 
unemployment benefits and re-compensate workers for the dissolution of the state-socialist 
social contract
19, more recent reform trajectories involve the restriction in entitlement criteria 
and in the amount of unemployment benefits, now accused of providing disincentives to re-
enter the labour market. This shift of social policy paradigm has not only implied a 
                                                 
14 For a detailed discussion on the problems associated with the establishment of the three-pillar 
scheme in Central and Eastern Europe see Cerami (2006a, pp.88-106). 
15 In order to finance the switch from pay-as-you-go to funded schemes, current workers are called 
to pay, for current pensioners, as well as their own personal funds. For more information on this 
topic see Bonoli (2000), Myles and Pierson (2001). 
16 Hungary, for example, has recently been forced to remove the obligation for career starters to 
take part to the private pillar and the state guarantee for the second pillar has also been abolished. 
17 The Semashko health care model was a highly centralized scheme, fully part of the central 
planned economy. The Soviet organizational structure implied that decisions concerning health care 
planning were taken at the national level with little or no knowledge of local requests. For more 
information on the communist health care model see Cerami (2006a, pp. 107-122).  
18 For similar considerations on financing social protection in France, see Palier (2005).  
19 The foundation of the communist social contract was based on full employment. Every 
communist citizen had the right and obligation to work for the sustenance of his or her family. 
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redefinition of responsibilities for the dismissals of numerous workers following the 
restructuring of firms from the state to the individual, but it has also produced the negative 
effect in marginalizing an increasing number of citizens who have seen their jobs 
disappeared and have been unable, due to an inefficient labour market, to find alternative 
sources of income.  
 
The establishment of a basic social safety net, introduced in the first years of transformation 
with the idea of providing an immediate help to the, supposedly, few disadvantaged people 
and losers of economic transition, has, only, to some extent, been successful in reducing 
extreme poverty or targeting the real poor (World Bank 2004). Milanovic (1998, p.118) has 
estimated, for instance, that in order to guarantee a minimum income level to these 
populations, it would be necessary to spend, on average, from 9 to 10 percent of GDP each 
year. Evidently, these are exceptionally high amounts that no country could afford. 
 
The present and future negative social consequences of transformation clearly represents a 
serious challenge to what Offe (2003a) defines as the process of democratization of 
democracy. A democracy cannot be stabilized if its core functions are not democratized. 
Democratic functions, however, tend to go beyond simple institutional structures that allow a 
democratic system to be representative, such as the existence of fair and equal election, free 
media, checks and balances or powers or instruments of direct democracy (e.g. 
referendums). Rather, they correspond to the real possibility of citizens to have equal access 
to democratic benefits, such as the absence of any form, in the widest possible sense, of 
discrimination. What should not be forgotten, as Offe remembers, is that “the modern state 
does not have a universally recognized “meta-social” mandate from which its legitimacy can 
be derived, it turns to the “people” as its ultimate source of authority” (Offe 2003b, p. 103). 
For these reasons and, in particular, because of the important redistributive role that welfare 
institutions can play in amortizing the costs of transition, this paper proposes to include 
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welfare state efficiency, often neglected by political analysts, as a core element in the 
process of democratic consolidation of post-communist countries. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis carried out in previous sections has highlighted the weaknesses and the 
precarious character of Central and Eastern European transition towards democracy. On the 
basis of the concept of embedded democracy, this article has demonstrated that one of the 
three rings of external embeddedness (the ring concerning the social and economic 
requisites of democracy) still shows significant deficiencies and that this is influencing the 
attitudes of Eastern citizens fostering preferences for one-party instead of multi-party 
systems. As the analysis of the preferences according to the position of the individual in the 
social and labour structure has shown, despite the existence of intra-region differences, a 
large proportion of workers, especially those in the lower positions, now express preferences 
for non-democratic forms of governments. It can thus be concluded that this socio-economic 
context is negatively impacting the area of behaviour consolidation and, for this reason, 
Central and Eastern European societies cannot be addressed yet as fully liberal 
democracies, but rather they should be considered as democracies at risk or as semi-
consolidated democracies. This paper also proposes to introduce welfare state efficiency as 
a core element in the analysis of the processes of democratic consolidation, since the 
redistributive impact of welfare institutions provides legitimacy to the political and institutional 
order recently established.  
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